Channels through which monetary policy affects aggregate demand can be divided into three groups: traditional interest rate channel, other asset price channels and credit channel composed of balance sheet channel (named also broad credit channel), only recently separated bank capital channel and bank lending channel. Banks face troubles in keeping their present or acquiring new fi nancial sources, when central bank tightens its monetary policy. Banks characterized by differences in size, capitalization, liquidity and ownership face different levels of informational asymmetry and are therefore differently affected by changes in monetary policy. If larger, better capitalized, more liquid, state owned and/or domestically owned banks respond weaker to changes in monetary policy it is possible to argue that bank lending channel is effective. This hypothesis is tested on a panel of annual data for individual Slovenian banks in the period between 1993 and 2007 using general method of moments. Results largely confi rm the existence of the bank lending channel in Slovenia.
Introduction
Bank lending channel is a part of the so called credit channel of monetary transmission mechanism that gained importance after the publication of Bernanke and Blinder's seminal paper in 1988. Its traditional mechanism as described by Bernanke and Blinder goes as follows: contractionary monetary policy reduces banks' reserves and deposits, which consequently reduces the quantity of bank loans available, further reducing output as a result of the fact that some borrowers are bank-loan dependent and cannot get adequate funds elsewhere. Several additions and corrections of the mechanism have been made in the subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses, especially by Stein (1998) .
The goal of the paper is to explore, how strong is the presence of the bank lending channel in Slovenia. Structure of the paper is as follows: theoretical foundations are presented fi rst, followed by explanation of the model, description of the data and fi nally panel data econometric analysis based on annual bank level data for the period 1994-2007.
Theoretical Overview
Monetary policy affects aggregate demand through three channels: (1) traditional interest rate channel; (2) asset price channels and (3) credit channel composed of balance sheet channel, bank lending channel and bank capital channel. When tight monetary policy decreases fi rms' net worth, information asymmetry 1 increases and banks become reluctant to lend (balance sheet channel or broad credit channel). Besides that contractionary monetary policy reduces banks' reserves and consequently deposits and accessibility of non-deposit sources, which consequently reduces the quantity of bank loans available, which forms bank lending channel (Mishkin, 2006; Ahtik, 2010b) . If bank's capital falls (this happens when interest rates rise causing bank profi ts and value of bank capital to fall), it has to accommodate its balance sheet structure to fulfi l solvency standards either by issuing new equity or by decreasing the amount of outstanding loans (Peek, Rosengren, 1995; Heuvel, 2002) . The later possibility further lowers investment and output.
Conditions for the validity of the so called lending view 2 (as an opposite to the money view) are:
(1) delayed accommodation of prices, which is a preposition common to all Keynesian models (Romer, 2006 ) and therefore will not be specially analysed,
(2) dependency of some fi rms and householes on bank loans and (3) the ability of a central bank to shift banks' loan supply schedules by conducting monetary policy operations (Kashyap, Stein, 1995) .
Credit institutions specialize in gathering information, overcoming transaction costs by exploring economies of scale and monitoring the performance of borrowers. As a consequence, customer and auction market credit cannot be considered perfect substitutes (Bernanke, Blinder, 1988) . Regardless of profound changes in information technology that reduced transaction costs and information asymmetry, imperfect substitutability pertains. Therefore, bank loans still have special status that cannot be equalised with the status of other debt instruments. This conclusion is especially valid for countries or regions that have a large share of bank dependent fi rms in their economies.
3
Ability of the central bank to infl uence banks' loan supply was modelled in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) . Their model is based on IS LM model and includes three types of 1 Situation, when one party has more or better information than the other party of the transaction.
2 Lending view is a specifi c case of the multi-asset models that have been present in the economic literature for a long period of time and feature imperfect substitutability among a number of assets, and allow for a number of different interest rates (Kashyap, Stein, 1995) .
3 This is the case in the European Union, including Slovenia (more in: Ahtik, 2009 (Freixas, Rochet, 1999) .
Banks cannot compensate for reduction in deposits caused by central bank with non-deposit sources without costs. Which model of accommodation is chosen by the bank, depends on the level of information asymmetry that it encounters. According to Stein's (1998) microeconomic model of bank lending channel banks' management let alone their investors (depositors, stockholders, etc.) are not familiar with the value of banks' assets that importantly determines probability and size of revenues on non-deposit sources of banks' fi nancing.
Response of banks to tightening of monetary policy crucially depends on their balance sheets structure (Stein, 1998) . Banks with lower quality of their assets face higher information asymmetry and are required to pay higher revenues to non-deposit investors, 4 when their stance becomes familiar to their investors. Therefore they keep a precautionary amount of securities that can be reduced in case of a tight monetary policy. Another possible response is reduction of outstanding loans. Different responses of banks with different characteristics to changes in monetary policy can help to identify changes in bank loan supply.
Validity of both Bernanke and Blinder and Stein's theories can be questioned, but, as argued in Ahtik (2010b) , it is possible to preserve the validity of the theory, despite the fact that the infl uence of the central bank on bank deposits is rather limited nowadays. Monetary policy may (although only limitedly) affect structure of deposits and their price, which has similar consequences as in a traditional model: more expensive deposits represent an obstacle to lending activity. More important change that happened in the pre-crisis period is greater dependence on non-deposit sources. Troubled banks usually experience diffi culties in acquiring funds on fi nancial markets after deposit outfl ow that follows the tightening of monetary policy (Stein, 1998) . However, as explained in Ahtik (2010b) , these diffi culties are not necessarily connected to deposit outfl ow. Monetary policy may affect also the value of bank assets, which affects the price and availability of non-deposit funds, without infl uencing the amount of deposits. Therefore, monetary policy can affect banks' loan supply. 4 Deposit investors are not endangered by lower quality of bank assets since they enjoy deposit insurance. 
Econometric Analysis

Overview of Previous Analyses
Model and Methodology Used
Model used in econometric analysis is simplifi ed version of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , based on similar microeconomic empirical analyses conducted for United States (Kashyap, Stein, 1997) and European Union Member States (Ehrmann et al., 2001) . Analysis focuses on lending and deposit market leaving out the effects of loans on investment and product.
Demand for loans of an individual bank i (L i D ) depends on central bank interest rate (i), economic conditions (y) and price stability (p) (Ehrmann et al., 2001) . Reaction of loan demand is independent of bank characteristics.
Supply of loans of an individual bank (L i S ) depends on deposit funds availability (D), on non-deposit funds availability (ND) and on central bank interest rate (i).
As explained previously monetary policy infl uences price and availability of deposit and non-deposit sources. Tightening of monetary policy reduces availability of non-deposit sources. Not all banks are equally hurt -information asymmetry (changed by monetary policy) affects possibilities of banks to acquire non-deposit funding. Capability of coping with information asymmetry might be detected through different characteristics of banks (X), among them being size, share of liquid assets, capital adequacy, revenues of banks, share of deposit fi nancing and ownership structure. Share of non-deposit sources (ND) depends on monetary policy of the central bank (mp) and on characteristics of the bank (X). Those characteristics affect the share of non-deposit sources independently (X) and as interactions with monetary policy indicator (Xmp), meaning that availability of non-deposit sources changes with change of monetary policy differently for banks with different bank characteristics.
Deposit sources (D) are not dependent on bank characteristics because they enjoy deposit guarantees. They depend on monetary policy (mp) and on non-fi nancial motives that cannot be modelled. Later share of deposits shall be included in the model as one of bank characteristics that affects the movement of loans. Monetary policy dependent deposits are shown in:
Equilibrium on loan market can be written as
Reduced form equation being:
where X represents bank characteristics that after the change of monetary policy crucially determine possibilities for non-deposit fi nancing. If simplifi ed, equation writes as
The coeffi cient 4 connects the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy changes with bank characteristic. If signifi cant, parameter 4 implies that monetary policy affects loan supply. Reaction of loan demand across banks is presumed to be homogeneous in order to identify the loan supply effects of monetary policy.
Methodology used is panel data estimation. Since partial adjustment model (Gujarati, 2003) is used, fi xed effects estimation method is biased and inconsistent due to the inclusion of a lagged dependant variable (Baltagi, 2008) . Therefore general method of moments (GMM) was used. Lagged values of fi rst differences of dependent variable were used as instruments as suggested in Arellano, Bover (1995) . Validity of instruments was tested using Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the null hypothesis of overall validity of the instruments used. Failure to reject this null hypothesis (p-value above 0.1) gives support to the selection of the instruments (Sargan, 1958) .
Data Description and Variables Selection
Annual data for period between 1993 and 2007 have been used. Year of the introduction of the euro, 2007, is included since it is assumed that monetary policy affects banks' activity with a lag. Period after introduction of the euro is excluded due to structural break and lack of suffi cient data. Data for 45 cross-section units have been used, although they (because of mergers and acquisitions) do not necessarily represent independent legal subjects. Panel is unbalanced since some mergers, liquidations and green-fi eld investments happened during the period analyzed. In comparison with previous analyses data for all banks functioning in Slovenia are used here.
Bank balance sheet and income statements data have been taken from publications Financial Statements of Banks in Slovenia (Banking Association of Slovenia; ZBS) or individual banks' websites, while monetary aggregates, interest rate, GDP and infl ation rate data have been taken from Bank of Slovenia (BS) and Statistical Offi ce of Slovenia (SURS) basis. Data have been adjusted for price growth using HICP.
Similarly as in other transition economies it is very diffi cult to choose monetary policy stance indicator. Monetary policy of Bank of Slovenia was strongly determined by its goal of keeping real exchange rate stable or slightly depreciating in order to support exporters. Excessive amount of money in circulation created through foreign exchange purchases was sterilized by issuance of Bank of Slovenia bills. Therefore several monetary policy stance indicators, such as monetary aggregate 2 (M2; composed of demand deposits, deposits with agreed maturity up to two years and deposits redeemable at notice up to three months, while currency was excluded in order to take into account the change of monetary policy regime in 2007), central bank interest rate (IR_CB) and money market interest rate (OM_DT) were considered. M2 exhibits endogeneity, since the movement of bank liabilities and assets is tightly connected. Main argument for choice of M2 is wide variety of monetary policy instruments 5 used by Bank of Slovenia in period investigated that complicates the selection of the proper central bank interest rate. Money market rate is problematic due to low development of money market because of which movements of the money market interest rate did not exhibit central bank activity very well. Besides that money market rate was not the explicit target of central bank's activities. Considering central bank interest rate it is diffi cult to decide which interest rate to use due to large number of instruments used. Central bank interest rate used here is an interest rate on bills that BS was issuing in order to remove primary money from circulation and is determined for the period from 1997 on (Ahtik, 2009 ). All three monetary policy stance indicators were used in order to get a more complete picture of a monetary transmission mechanism in Slovenia. Real exchange rate (DT_R) is expressed in tolars (SIT) per euro and corrected for price growth in Slovenia and its major economic partners. Exchange rate affects the value of bank assets and liabilities in foreign currency. Since Slovenian banks mostly exhibited short position, real depreciation could increase the value of their liabilities as compared with their assets and decrease capital (Ahtik, 2010a) . On the other hand depreciation reduces the price of loans of domestic banks as compared with competition abroad (Ahtik, 2009) , although this effect is not considered to be large. Anyway, effect of real exchange rate on bank loans remains dubious.
Gross domestic product (GDP) represents a proxy for demand. It is expected to have a positive effect on the amount of loans. Higher GDP is connected with greater optimism causing increase in consumer and investment spending.
Infl ation rate (INFL) is also used as proxy for demand, although its infl uence remains ambiguous. On one hand higher infl ation increases risk and decreases loan demand, while on the other hand increases spending due to the phenomenon of money illusion. Data for loans to non-banking sector (KRED_NEBAN) were used, since it is reasonable to expect that these types of loans actually affect investment, consumption and production.
Measures of bank characteristics included in equations are size, liquidity, capitalization, profi tability and ownership structure.
As a measure of relative size of a bank (SIZE), share of bank assets in total banking sector (market share) is used. Larger banks explore economies of scale and scope more effi ciently; acquiring information about them is less expensive, therefore they obtain non-deposit sources more easily. They are expected to diminish the effi ciency of the monetary policy, since it has less effect on their capability to acquire non-deposit sources as compared with smaller banks.
Liquidity is measured as a share of cash in total assets (LIKVA). Alternatively sum of cash and securities to total bank assets are used (LIKV1A). As emphasized by Stein (1998) banks endogenously increase liquid assets when they expect problems with acquiring non-deposit sources. When compared with banks that did not manage to increase their liquid assets banks with higher levels of liquid assets are expected to reduce the effi ciency of monetary policy (Ahtik, 2010a) .
Offi cial data for capital adequacy ratio (CAR) were used as measures for capitalization. Banks with higher CAR are expected to reduce the effi ciency of monetary policy, since they are not limited with capital adequacy demands.
Banks with lower levels of deposit fi nancing (DEPA) are expected to be less affected by monetary policy. As it was explained above, depositors are rather immobile, therefore deposits represent a buffer for changes in monetary policy.
Profi tability was measured with revenue on assets (ROA). It is expected that it negatively affects the effi ciency of monetary policy, since ROA affects the capability of acquiring additional funds.
Dummy for foreign ownership (D_LAST) takes the value of 1, if bank is in domestic ownership and the value of 0 if bank is foreign owned. It is expected that foreign owned banks enjoy the benefi t of connection with their larger mothers from abroad that enable them to fi nance cheaper. Therefore it is expected that domestic ownership increases effi ciency of monetary policy.
Dummy for state ownership (D_DRZAV)
7 takes the value of 1, if bank is in state ownership and the value of 0 if bank is privately owned. Expected sign for this variable is ambiguous. On one hand, it is expected that state owned banks acquire funds in international fi nancial markets more easily due to implicit (or explicit) guarantee of the state, while on the other hand they might be, because of state's infl uence on banks' management, "used" for conduct of monetary policy. Former case means that the effi ciency of monetary policy is decreased, while the later one means an increase in its effi ciency.
Most important variable in each equation is product of monetary policy stance indicator (M2, IR_CB or OM_DT) and individual banking characteristic (SIZE, LIKVA, LIKV1A, CAR, DEPA, ROA, D_LAST, D_DRZAV). If this combined variable has the same sign as monetary policy stance indicator, this means that effi ciency of monetary policy is increased by the presence of a certain bank characteristic and vice versa if the sign is opposite as the sign of the independent monetary policy stance indicator (Ehrmann et al., 2001) . Double interactions (product of two banking characteristics and monetary policy stance indicator) are used as well. They enable testing whether the effect of one bank characteristics depends on the presence of the other (Kashyap, Stein, 1997; Ehrmann et al., 2001) . Data on loans (KRED_NEBAN), monetary aggregate (M2) and GDP enter equations as fi rst differences of logarithms (approximations of growth rates) and interest rates (IR_CB, OM_DT) as fi rst differences 8 in order to take care of non-stationarity of the data (Baltagi, 2008) , while liquidity, capitalization, profi tability and size data are expressed in percentages. 9 Real exchange rate and market concentration enter in levels.
7 Variables D_DRZAV and D_LAST partly cover the same set of banks, since banks in majority state ownership functioning in Slovenian banking market were naturally also domestically owned.
8
In Tables 2-6 represented as "DLOG" and "D", respectively.
9
Precise description of variable formation is given in Table 1 . (Tables 2 and 3 ; Equations (1-12), followed by specifi cations with central bank interest rate (Table 4 ; Equations 1-7) and money market interest rate (Tables 5  and 6 ; Equations 1-12).
In Equation 1 (Table 2) 10 exchange rate (DT_R), GDP, monetary aggregate M2, infl ation rate (INFL), banking market concentration ratio (K5) and dummy for change in accounting standards (D_REVALOR) are regressed on loans to non-banking sector (KRED_NEBAN). All of the variables are statistically signifi cant. GDP in accordance with expectations positively infl uences loans, while INFL, K5 and D_REVALOR exhibit negative infl uence on KRED_NEBAN. Also monetary policy variable (M2) exhibits expected positive infl uence on loans while negative infl uence of DT_R confi rms theory that exchange rate depreciation causes revaluation of bank foreign assets and liabilities, which in case of their short foreign exchange positions leads to reduction of lending activity. 
Measure of capital adequacy (CAR) used in Equation 5 is statistically insignifi cant.
It is possible to confi rm that banks in majority state ownership (D_DRZAV, Equation 6) in average increase the effi ciency of monetary policy, which might lead to the confi rmation of the hypothesis that they were actually used for monetary policy conduct. Similarly, banks in majority domestic ownership (D_LAST, Equation 7) in average increase the effi ciency of monetary policy as well. This is in accordance with expectations since banks in foreign ownership might expect support from their parent institution in case of contractionary policy of the host central bank.
Equations 8-12 are presented in Table 3 . Equation 8 shows that banks with higher share of deposits among their liabilities in average decrease the effi ciency of monetary policy. 11 In all equations presented ***, **,* indicate signifi cance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. Results of two-tailed test are presented meaning that null hypothesis of "coeffi cient is equal to 0" is tested.
PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 1, 2012  61 Equation 11 uses share of deposit fi nancing (DEPA) instead of LIKVA. Banks with higher level of deposit fi nancing negatively affect monetary policy effi ciency.
Equation 12 makes usage of a banking structure variable -banking sector concentration (K5). It shows that monetary policy in average affects bank loans (KRED_NEBAN) less in case of higher concentration. Table 4 shows seven equations that use central bank interest rate (IR_CB) as a monetary policy stance indicator. Results are not as good as with M2, since a large share of variables used does not statistically signifi cantly affect loans (KRED_NEBAN).
Similarly as in Table 2 Equation 1 Equations 6 and 7 include products of two banking characteristics and monetary policy stance indicator that enable us to identify infl uence of two co-existent banking characteristics.
Product of SIZE with monetary policy stance indicator (IR_CB) positively infl uences loans (KRED_NEBAN), meaning that bank size negatively affects monetary policy effi ciency. It is possible to observe the same effect with LIKVA. Interaction of SIZE, LIKVA and IR_CB has a negative sign, meaning that smaller banks with lower level of liquidity in average increase monetary policy effi ciency in comparison with banks of similar size, but with higher liquidity (Equation 6).
Equation 7 includes share of deposits (DEPA) instead of LIKVA. Product of size (SIZE) and central bank interest rate (IR_CB) as well as product of DEPA and IR_CB exhibit positive infl uence on bank loans (KRED_NEBAN), while double interaction (DEPA*SIZE*IR_CB) with negative sign shows that smaller banks with smaller share of deposit fi nancing increase monetary policy effi ciency in comparison with banks of similar size, but with larger share of deposit fi nancing. Effect of bank market concentration (K5) has a positive sign, showing that higher concentration negatively affects monetary policy effi ciency (Equation 12).
Conclusion
Banking characteristics exhibit similar infl uence on loans, regardless of the monetary policy stance indicator used. More profi table, more liquid banks and more depositdependant banks diminish the effectiveness of monetary policy. Those banks possess a buffer in their balance sheets that enables them to mitigate the effects of monetary policy on their lending.
Results are a bit more uncertain with size indicator. Equations that show that larger banks reduce monetary policy effectiveness include some other bank characteristics as well, while in specifi cations with size as the only banking characteristic expected negative infl uence on monetary policy effi ciency is observed. This enables a conclusion that other banking characteristics prevail and more successfully predict the movement of loans, which is confi rmed when products of several banking characteristics (among them size) and monetary policy stance indicator are included in the equation. As predicted by Stein's theory (1998) smaller banks compensate this defi ciency by shaping their balance sheets accordingly.
Capitalization is connected with lower monetary policy effi ciency in equations with money market interest rate as monetary policy stance indicator, while it does not affect the effectiveness of monetary policy in equations with M2. Besides that inclusion of this variable causes some inconsistencies in signs of other coeffi cients. Infl uence of capitalization on monetary policy effectiveness is therefore not fully confi rmed.
State ownership increases effi ciency of the monetary policy, which is in accordance with the hypothesis that state owned banks can be used to achieve some macroeconomic or monetary policy goals. Similarly domestically owned credit institutions increase the effi ciency of monetary policy, which is in accordance with expectations and fi ndings of Jimborean (2006) . It is possible to argue that subsidiaries of foreign banks can overcome changes in the monetary policy with help of their parent institutions. Changes in monetary policy affected them less, especially because parents belonged to different monetary policy area.
Higher concentration (which is a macro-level characteristics) has a negative effect on monetary policy effi ciency which is in accordance with expectations. Banks that function in less competitive environment respond less to changes in monetary policy and shield their balance sheets from changes in monetary policy better.
Slovenian banks with different characteristics respond differently to changes in monetary policy, therefore it is possible to conclude that bank lending channel in Slovenia exists which confi rms results of some previous analyses.
Despite the fact that Slovenia entered new monetary area in 2007, these fi ndings remain very useful. Identifi cation of bank characteristics that are important for monetary policy performance does not only help to identify bank lending channel, but it also shows area where it is still possible to infl uence the functioning of monetary policy. Regulatory powers that remain in capacity of Slovenian authorities are: regulating mergers and acquisitions, approving foreign take-overs, changing liquidity and (to some extent) capitalization demands, changing taxation of revenue and tax treatment of interest from deposits. Some of those measures have been successfully used by Bank of Slovenia and Slovenian government in the period of fi nancial crisis.
